Publications: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Unavailable in ADA Retaliation Claims

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On June 21, 2004 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review, thereby allowing to stand, a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision holding that compensatory and punitive damages are unavailable to employees claiming unlawful retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”).

The Seventh Circuit’s January 2004 decision in Kramer v. Banc of America Securities was ultimately based on a literal reading of the ADA, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (the “1964 Act”) and of the 1991 Civil Rights Act (the “1991 Act”). The Kramer Court ultimately ruled that none of these statutes authorized ADA retaliation plaintiffs to recover compensatory or punitive damages. As the issue in Kramer was one of first impression for the Seventh Circuit, it reviewed decisions of the Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, and of several district courts before reaching its holding. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the decisions of other circuit courts of appeals, finding that they had addressed whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant compensatory and punitive damages rather than the more fundamental issue of whether such damages were recoverable at all under the ADA.

After noting the district courts’ disagreement on the issue presented, the Seventh Circuit adopted a Missouri district court’s analysis in Brown v. City of Lee’s Summit, and found “a meticulous tracing of the language of this tangle of interrelated statutes reveals no basis” for plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages in ADA retaliation actions. The Seventh Circuit declined to consider the ADA’s legislative intent or history, finding that unambiguous statutory language made it unnecessary to examine anything but the text itself.

The Seventh Circuit also held that because compensatory and punitive damages are unavailable in ADA retaliation cases, there is no statutory or constitutional right to jury trials in such cases. Noting that only equitable remedies are available in ADA retaliation claims and that jury trials are not mandated in cases involving only equitable claims, the Court found that jury trials are permitted in ADA retaliation cases only upon consent of the parties and the court pursuant to the federal rules. The court found that because Banc of America timely withdrew its consent to a jury trial (two weeks before trial) the plaintiff lacked the consent she needed to obtain a jury trial.